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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This is an appeal from the third amended judgment of conviction entered against 
Appellant Albert Moore. R 146-150. The third amended judgment of conviction which reduced 
Mr. Moore's credit for time served should be vacated because it was entered in violation ofMr. 
Moore's constitutional right to due process - specifically in entering the order, the District Court 
was acting as prosecutor not judge. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On September 3, 2006, Mr. Moore was arrested for DUI, I.e. § 18-8004, and for driving 
without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001. Ada County No. CR-FE-2008-373. While charges from this 
arrest remained pending, on April 28, 2007, Mr. Moore was again arrested for DUI. Ada County 
No. CR-FE-2008-374. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 890-91,231 P.3d 532,535-36 (Ct. App. 
2010). Case Number 373 was assigned to Judge McLaughlin and is the case underlying this 
appeal. ROA CR-FE-2008-373. Case Number 374 was assigned to Judge Wilper. ROA CR-
FE-2008-374.1 
Both cases were charged as felonies based upon the State's allegation that Mr. Moore 
had been previously convicted of DUI within the preceding ten years - in Idaho in 2006 and in 
North Dakota in 1999. Mr. Moore went to trial in Case No. 374 and was convicted. He entered 
J Mr. Moore ultimately appealed from his judgments of conviction in both these cases. 
S.Ct. No. 35486-2008, S.Ct. No. 36033-2009. The two cases were consolidated for appeal. 
State v. Moore, supra, and this Court has taken judicial notice of the clerk's record and 
transcripts of both cases for purposes of this appeal, per its order entered February 28,2013. R 
40673-2013 p. 2-3. 
an Alforcf plea in Case No. 373, retaining his right to appeal the denial of a speedy trial motion 
and the issue of whether the North Dakota conviction could properly be used to enhance the DUI 
charge. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho at 890-91, 231 P.3d at 535-36. 
In the consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals held that State's Exhibit 4, the judgment 
of conviction, copy of the uniform complain and summons, and a bench warrant for a probation 
violation purportedly from North Dakota, was improperly admitted in the trial in Case No. 374 
because it was not certified and therefore not authenticated pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho at 892, 231 P.3d at 537. 
Mr. Moore had also argued that the Court erred in allowing the North Dakota conviction 
to form the basis of the felony charge because the State failed to establish a prima facie showing 
that his guilty plea in North Dakota was obtained with a knowing, voluntary waiver of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. However, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument. ld, 148 
Idaho at 894, 231, at 539. 
Mr. Moore further argued that the North Dakota conviction could not be used because the 
North Dakota statute was not "substantially conforming" to Idaho's statute. And, again the Court 
of Appeals rejected the argument. ld, 148 Idaho at 898-99, 231 P.3d at 544-45. 
In case 373, the Court of Appeals rejected the speedy trial argument. ld, 148 Idaho at 
899-904,231 P.3d at 545-49. 
The remedy applied was vacation of the judgment of conviction and remand in Case No. 
374. In Case No. 373, the Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the plea 
agreement and its decision holding that Exhibit 4 was not properly admitted in Case No. 374. 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). 
2 
Id., 148 Idaho at 904, 231 P .3d at 532. 
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted that Mr. Moore had been given 848 days credit 
for time served in case No. 373. The Court further commented, "While not at issue on appeal, a 
review of the record indicates that between his arrest on September 3, 2006, and sentencing on 
December 31, 2008, Moore was incarcerated for a total of 470 days as a result of the two DUI 
charges." 148 Idaho at 891, 231 P.3d at 536, ftnt. 5. 
On remand in case No. 374, the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor and Mr. Moore 
was sentenced to 365 days all of which he had already served. ROA CR-FE-2008-374. 
On remand in case No. 373, Mr. Moore argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his 
Alford plea and asserted that he had no valid conviction from North Dakota. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 2, In. 
9 - p. 3, In. 2. The Court noted Mr. Moore's objections and then found that the State had now 
presented a properly certified judgment from North Dakota and that it was an appropriate 
enhancing offense. The Court then stated that an amended judgment would be prepared with the 
June 9, 2010 date and credit for time served as given earlier. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 6, In. 3 - p. 7, In. 4. 
The Court stated: "The Court will impose the sentence of one year fixed, four years 
indeterminate for five years." Tr. 6/9/10, p. 7, In. 3-4. A written judgment exactly mirroring this 
language was filed two days later. The judgment imposed a five year term with one year fixed 
and granted credit for time served of848 days as of December 31, 2008. R 27. 
Neither the defense counsel nor the State filed a notice of appeal from the amended 
judgment. ROA. 
However, Mr. Moore filed a pro se pleading entitled "Motion for Documents or Petition." 
In it, he noted the right to appellate review. The District Court wrote on the pleading that it was 
3 
denying the request, but that Mr. Moore might want to file a petition for post-conviction relief 
and seek appointed counsel. R 30-31. 
On September 10, 2010, after the time for appeal had passed, the State filed a motion to 
correct judgment of conviction and to clarifY credit for time served. The State sought a second 
amended judgment to increase the penalty to six years with one fixed and to reduce the credit for 
time served to 477 days. R 34-37. 
Mr. Moore objected at the hearing on the State's motion. He argued that the 848 days 
credit for time served was not a 'clerical' error that could be corrected at any time. He further 
argued that the sentence imposed by the Court on remand, both orally and in writing, was five 
years with one fixed and that to change that now would violate due process and double jeopardy 
guarantees. Tr. 1017/10, p. 7, In. 10 - p.l0, In. 24. 
However, the District Court held that it had the power to correct an oral sentence, stated 
that it never intended to reduce Mr. Moore's sentence, imposed a term of six years with one 
fixed, and reduced the credit for time served to 477 days. Tr. 1017/10, p. 13, In. 1 - p. 14, In. 25. 
A conforming written second amended judgment was filed. R 44-47. 
Mr. Moore then filed apro se rule 35 motion arguing that the resentencing on October 7, 
2010, was illegal because the Court was without jurisdiction and the resentencing was 
unconstitutional. He also asked that the sentence be reduced. R 48-50. 
The Court did not rule on Mr. Moore's claim that the resentencing was unconstitutional. 
Rather, the Court denied the Rule 35 motion's request for reduction of sentence. R 63-66. 
Counsel and Mr. Moore both filed notices of appeal from the second amended judgment 
of conviction. R 72-82. And on appeal, entry of the second amended judgment of conviction 
4 
was affinned. State v. Moore, 152 Idaho 203, 268 P.3d 471 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Mr. Moore then filed a pro se ICR 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence raising 
allegations that the second amended judgment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and was 
precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; his conviction was the result of vindictive 
prosecution and a biased trial judge; and a violation of speedy trial rights. The motion was 
denied and the denial affinned in an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals filed on 
December 19,2012. State v. Moore, S.Ct. No. 39914,2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 764.3 
Mr. Moore continued filing documents in the District Court during the pendency of the 
appeal in S.Ct. No. 39914. R40673, pp. 12-14,16-17. And the District Court declined to rule 
on them based on its lack of jurisdiction during the appeal. R 40673, pp. 15, 18. 
Then on September 25,2012, Mr. Moore filed a motion for credit for time served. R 
40673 pp. 19-20. He argued that he should be given credit for time served on the prior DUIs that 
were used to elevate the charge in this case to a felony. R 40673, pp. 21-23. Again the District 
Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to act while the case was on appeal. R 40673, pp. 24-
25. 
Mr. Moore again filed a motion under ICR 35(c) seeking credit for time served. R 40673, 
pp.26-30. The Court then set the motion for a hearing stating that it did have jurisdiction to rule 
on an ICR 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Court further stated that it believed that 
Mr. Moore had received too much credit for time served and asked both the State and Mr. Moore 
to submit in writing how much credit he should receive. R 40673 pp. 31-33. 
3 This Court has taken judicial notice of the record and decision in No. 39914. R 40673, 
pp.2-3. 
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Mr. Moore complied with the Court's request writing that he had already served 4 years 
and 118 days beyond the sentence of five years. He also noted that if he was to remain in prison 
as long as IDOC records indicated he would have to serve to complete his sentence, he would 
serve a total 14 years 118 days on an offense that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. R 
40673, pp. 37-43. 
The State did not comply with the Court's request. ROA 40673. 
On December 13,2012, Mr. Moore filed another motion for credit for time served 
arguing that he should be given a new trial. R 40673, pp. 117-19. 
A hearing was held on January 11,2013. R 40673, p. 121. 
At the hearing, the Court noted that the State had not responded to Mr. Moore's motion 
or the Court's request for a calculation of credit for time served. Tr. 1111/13, p. 9, In. 5-15. 
The State responded that it had not received the Court's order setting the case for a 
hearing and asking for a written calculation of credit for time served and had believed that the 
second amended judgment of conviction had included the proper credit for time served. And 
then the prosecutor stated: 
However, now reviewing it after your [the Court's] indication that he may have 
received too much credit, I believe I was in error in that summary as well by 70 
days. I can summarize the dates of incarceration and the days, I believe, he's 
entitled to now, if you'd like. 
Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 9-15. 
Mr. Moore, acting pro se, objected. "Well, I think that the prosecution means that they 
couldn't even put their motion in a -according to procedures-procedurally barred from saying 
anything." Tr. 1111113, p. 10, In. 20-23. 
6 
Mr. Moore continued: 
The reason is that there is nonnal procedure. You get the motion. I get the 
motion. They can't say that they didn't get my motion. So if they were going to 
investigate anything or even use a little bit of intequity (verbatim), they then said, 
oh, why is he sending us this, and check with the court, but apparently they didn't. 
Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 25 - p. 11, In. 7. 
The Court said that there was nothing wrong the procedure being employed. Tr. 1111113, 
p. 11, In. 14-16. 
The Court asked Mr. Moore to give it numbers, and Mr. Moore stated that he is entitled 
to 750 days served in North Dakota, 848 days originally given in this case, 50 days from Bonner 
County, and 21 days served in Challis, Idaho. Tr. 1111/13, p. 14, In. 23 - p. 15, In. 3. 
The State then told the Court that Mr. Moore was entitled to 407 days of credit for time 
served. Tr. 1111/13, p. 17, In. 17-p. 18, In. 25. The State's math was as follows: 
1) Arrest on September 3, 2006, release on bond on November 25,2006: 84 days 
2) Arrest on August 1,2007, release on bond on August 10,2007: 10 days 
3) Arrest on February 23, 2008, sentence on December 31,2008: 313 days 
Total: 407 days 
Tr. 1111113,p. 17, In. 17-p.18,ln.25. 
After the hearing, the Court entered the third amended judgment of conviction granting 
Mr. Moore only 407 days credit for time served. R 40673 pp. 125-28. 
Mr. Moore filed a timely notice of appeal. R 40673 pp. 146-50. 
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III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court violate Mr. Moore's state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process by taking on the role of prosecutor in decreasing Mr. Moore's credit for time served by 
70 days? U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Third Amended Judgment of Conviction Was Entered in Violation ofMr. 
Moore's State and Federal Constitutional Rights to Due Process 
The 'right to due process requires an impartial judge.' State v. Lanliford, 116 
Idaho 860, 875, 781 P.2d 197,212 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 
3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 803 (1990). A trial judge must avoid the appearance of 
advocacy or of partiality, but at the same time is not 'expected to sit mute and 
impassive, speaking only to rule on motions or objections.' United States. V 
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. 
Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1978)). If a judge engages in prosecutorial 
acts, such acts may be violative of the defendant's constitutional rights. Lanliford, 
116 Idaho at 875, 781 P.2d at 212. 
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 913, 71 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2003). 
In this case, the District Court took on the role of prosecutor when it determined on its 
own initiative that it had previously given Mr. Moore too much credit for time served. The Court 
acted as prosecutor in originally presenting the theory that it may have given Mr. Moore too 
much credit for time served in its second amended judgment. At that point, the Court called on 
both Mr. Moore and the prosecutor to present written calculations of the time served. Mr. Moore 
did so. The State did not submit anything. Then, the State at the hearing when called upon by 
the Court did finally present a calculation - but only over Mr. Moore's objection. As Mr. Moore 
stated, "The reason [for objection] is that there is a normal procedure. You [the Court] get the 
motion. I get the motion .... " Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 25 - p. 11, In. 7. Here the Court did not 
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follow the normal procedure, but rather took on the role of the prosecutor. 
"The trial court 'must not take on the role of a partisan .... Prosecution and judgment are 
two separate functions in the administration of justice; they must not merge. '" Robinson v. 
United States, 513 A.2d 218,222 (D.C. 1986). Robinson held that the court's suggestion ofa 
tactical course that the prosecution had not considered was improper. See a/so, Davis v. United 
States, 567 A.2d 36,41 (D.C. 1989), stating that ajudge's substantial interference in a trial can 
so prejudice the defendant as to require a new trial. See also, Lanliford, supra, and Lopez v. 
Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (1980). 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of 
cases. But our system has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness ... to 
perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. '" In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623,625 (1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). 
In this case, the Court took on the role of the prosecutor - indeed took on the role with 
more vigor than the prosecutor had applied to the case - determining on its own initiative that Mr. 
Moore had received too much credit for time served and pursuing that determination even when 
the State failed to respond to its request for a written calculation. This action denied Mr. 
Moore's due process rights. Murchison, supra, Lanliford, supra. 
Because Mr. Moore objected, the question on appeal is whether the deprivation of due 
process was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P .3d 
961 (2010), holding that the Chapman harmless error standard applies to all objected-to error. 
9 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). And, in this case, the 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the District Court not taken it upon itself 
to recalculate Mr. Moore's credit, the State would not have pursued the matter and Mr. Moore 
would have not lost 70 days credit for time served. 
Based upon this denial of due process, Mr. Moore requests that this Court vacate the third 
amended judgment of conviction and direct that the credit given in the second amended judgment 
be reinstated. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Moore respectfully requests that the third amended 
judgment of conviction be vacated and the second amended judgment be reinstated. 
Dated thiS~day of July, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Albert 
10 
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